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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Michael L. Rigsby*
I.

INTRODUCTION

All lawyers licensed in Virginia must adhere to the Disciplinary
Rules (DRs) and principles codified in the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility.' The ethical precepts contained therein constitute the bedrock upon which the notion of professionalism is
based. It distinguishes Virginia lawyers as members of a learned
profession. Unfortunately, all lawyers do not accept the ethical responsibilities which come with the privilege of licensure. For those
instances in which a lawyer strays from his ethical tethering, the
Supreme Court of Virginia has devised a procedure for investigating complaints of lawyer misconduct and, where appropriate, imposing discipline.2
Disciplinary proceedings are in the nature of a summary inquest
into the conduct of a lawyer.' Thus, discipline, when imposed, accomplishes three goals: (1) it protects the public from unscrupulous practitioners; (2) it instructs other members of the bar regarding unacceptable conduct; and (3) it punishes the errant lawyer.
The following cases discuss the principles which have emerged as
the bar has sought to meet these three objectives.
* Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Richmond;
B.S., 1967, Virginia Polytechnic Institute; J.D., 1969, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
I would be woefully remiss if I failed to recognize and thank my assistant, Gretchen
Franz, for her comprehensive assistance in preparing this article.
1. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(1) of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility
states: "A lawyer shall not [v]iolate a Disciplinary Rule or knowingly aid another to do so."
VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (1983).
2. For the procedures followed in disciplinary investigations, see VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 6,
§ IV, T 13.
3. "A [disciplinary] proceeding ... is merely civil in nature and not criminal." Maddy v.
Dist. Comm., 205 Va. 652, 658, 139 S.E.2d 56, 58 (1964). "[Disciplinary proceedings] are not
criminal, but merely civil in nature." Id. at 658, 139 S.E.2d at 60. Seventh Dist. Comm. of
the Va. State Bar v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 284, 183 S.E.2d 713, 717 (1971).
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COURT DECISIONS

A. Neglect
In Mathews v. Virginia State Bar,4 the supreme court considered whether a lawyer's failure to obey a court order constitutes
neglect in violation of former DR 6-101(A)(3) 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and whether willful disobedience of a
court order may be taken into account when determining a penalty. Lawyer Mathews was employed in the spring of 1979 to represent a client in a personal injury suit. Mathews waited until October 1980 to file a motion for judgment, at a time when the
statute of limitations had nearly run. He subsequently failed to answer opposing counsel's interrogatories. In June 1981, he received
an order compelling answers to the interrogatories, but still failed
to do so until January 1982, some seven months later.
During November 1981, the client complained to the Virginia
State Bar that he was unable to contact Mathews concerning the
status of his case. After an investigation and hearing, the Virginia
State Bar Disciplinary Board found Mathews was neglectful, in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3). The Board ordered the suspension of
Mathews' license for a period of two months. Mathews' appeal was
based upon the contention that violation of a court order may be
grounds for punishment for contempt, but that contempt of court
is not sufficient grounds to warrant disbarment. Mathews argued
further that since contempt is not grounds for disbarment, the
lesser penalty of suspension was not justified.'
4. 231 Va. 308, 343 S.E.2d 79 (1986).
5. Former DR 6-101(A)(3) of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility stated: "A
lawyer shall not. . . [nieglect a legal matter entrusted to him." DR 6-101(A)(3) (appearing
at 216 Va. 941 (1976)). The complaint against Mathews was initially filed in November, 1981
when the 1970 Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility was still in effect. The current
version was adopted June 1, 1983 and has been in effect since October 1, 1983. DR
6-101(A)(3) was not incorporated into the current Code. The current Code provisions relating to lawyer negligence are found in DR 6-101(B), (C), (D). DR 6-101(B) states that a
lawyer "shall attend promptly to matters undertaken for a client until completed or until
the lawyer has properly and completely withdrawn from representing the client." DR 6101(C) states that a lawyer "shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which
the lawyer's services are being rendered." DR 6-101(D) states that a lawyer "shall inform his
client of facts pertinent to the matter and of communications from another party that may
significantly affect settlement or resolution of the matter." VA. SuP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, Canon
6 (1983).
6. Mathews relied on In re Damron, 131 W. Va. 66, 45 S.E.2d 741 (1947), which held that
"an attorney may not be disbarred for contempt of court unless his act or course of conduct
amounts to bare and aggravated contempt." Id. at 78, 45 S.E.2d at 747.
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The Virginia Supreme Court rejected Mathews' argument and
affirmed the Disciplinary Board's order. The court agreed with the
Board's finding of neglect based upon the facts that Mathews virtually ignored his client's case for one and one half years and the
court order compelling answers to the interrogatories. The court
held that willful disobedience of a single court order may alone
justify disbarment and that the board was entirely justified in taking into account Mathews' admitted violation of the court's order
when considering punishment.7
In Pickus v. Virginia State Bar,8 lawyer Pickus provided real
estate settlement services for a client. As settlement counsel,
Pickus was instructed by the lending institutions involved in the
transactions to satisfy prior deeds of trust and to obtain mortgagee
title insurance policies insuring that the new loans constituted first
liens. Pickus obtained title insurance commitments, whereupon the
lending institutions delivered substantial funds with which to pay
off the prior deeds of trust. Rather than doing so, however, Pickus
delivered the funds to his client who told Pickus that he would pay
off the liens. However, the client did not pay off the liens. Pickus
accepted his client's representation without examining the land
records and advised both the title insurance company and the
lending institution that the loan was secured by a first deed of
trust. The title insurance company then issued a policy certifying
that fact.
The Disciplinary Board found Pickus guilty of violating DR 6101(A)(3) 9 as well as other provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On appeal, the court affirmed the Disciplinary
Board's finding that Pickus was neither competent nor prepared to
handle real estate matters. On the issue of neglect, Pickus argued
that since his client was not injured by his actions, Pickus did not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him by his client. The supreme
court rejected this narrow interpretation of DR 6-101(A)(3), concluding instead that its language encompasses the neglect of legal
matters entrusted to a lawyer whether entrusted by a client or a
7. 231 Va. at 311, 343 S.E.2d at 80. The court relied on Leimer v. Hulse, 352 Mo. 451, 178
S.W.2d 335, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 744 (1944), and In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 189 N.W.2d
176 (1971). In Leimer, the court held that conduct punishable as contempt of court may also
be considered as evidence that an attorney is unfit to practice law. 352 Mo. at , 178
S.W.2d at 339. The court in Daly held that willful disobedience of a single court order may
alone justify disbarment. 291 Minn. at 495, 189 N.W.2d at 181.
8. 232 Va. 5, 348 S.E.2d 202 (1986).
9. See supra note 6.
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third party. 10 Thus, when the lending institution in a real estate
transaction delivered loan proceeds to Pickus and directed that he
satisfy prior liens and obtain title insurance policies which insured
that the new loans were secured as first liens, Pickus was entrusted
with a legal matter. His failure to satisfy the prior liens and his
subsequent representation that the liens had been satisfied constituted neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by a third party
and was, therefore, a violation of DR 6-101(A)(3).
B.

Fraudulent and Deceitful Activity

In Gibbs v. Virginia State Bar," decided the same day as Pickus
v. Virginia State Bar" was decided, the supreme court considered
whether scienter is a necessary element of misrepresentation under
DR 1-102(A)(4)" of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 4
Without deciding the issue, the court concluded that the record in
5
each case was sufficient to establish a knowing misrepresentation.
Gibbs acquired a one-half interest in certain real estate and became a tenant in common with another person. The monthly mortgage payment included an accident and sickness insurance premium, which Gibbs wanted to cancel. The bank refused to accept
the monthly mortgage payment from Gibbs without the accident
and sickness insurance premium, unless it received a letter from
the co-tenant cancelling the insurance policy. Without the knowledge or consent of the co-tenant, Gibbs prepared a letter to the
bank over the forged signature of the co-tenant, requesting cancellation of the insurance policy.
Even though cancellation of the policy would have benefitted
both Gibbs and his co-tenant, and the co-tenant wanted the policy
cancelled, the court found that the bank was prejudiced by Gibbs'
10. Pickus, 232 Va. at 12, 348 S.E.2d at 207.
11. 232 Va. 39, 348 S.E.2d 209 (1986).
12. 232 Va. 5, 348 S.E.2d 202 (1986).
13. Pickus' violation occurred at a time prior to the revision of the Code in 1983. Former
DR 1-102(A)(4) stated: "A lawyer shall not [eingage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation." Rules of Court, 216 Va. 941, 1066 (1976), amended at Rules of
Court, 218 Va. 173, 192 (1977). Gibbs' violation occurred after the 1983 revisions came into
effect. DR 1-102(A)(4) now reads: "A lawyer shall not [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation which reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness to
practice law."
14. See Gibbs, 232 Va. at 41, 348 S.E.2d at 210; Pickus, 232 Va. at 9, 348 S.E.2d at 205.
15. See supra note 14.
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actions."6 If the co-tenant had died while still liable on the mortgage following the unauthorized cancellation of the insurance, the
bank would have been exposed to potential liability to the co-tenant's estate. 17 The court reasoned that since the bank was
prejudiced by Gibbs' actions and since Gibbs had been advised by
the bank that the co-tenant must authorize in writing the cancellation of the insurance, ample evidence existed to uphold the findings of the Disciplinary Board.'"
In Pickus, the supreme court concluded that scienter was established when Pickus certified in the real estate transactions that
prior liens had been satisfied and released of record when he knew
neither he nor anyone for whom he was responsible had done so.
The court stated that scienter was established by the clear proof
required in disciplinary proceedings.' The supreme court also held
that because Pickus violated DR 1-102(A)(4), it necessarily followed that he also was guilty of violations of DRs 1-102(A) (1)20
and 1-102(A)(6). 2 '
C. Preservationand Identity of Funds
The court announced an extremely important concept in Pickus
v. Virginia State Bar22 concerning the responsibility of a settlement attorney to unrepresented parties to the transaction. Pickus
was found to have violated DR 9-102.23 Pickus argued that the rule
16. 232 Va. at 42, 348 S.E.2d at 213.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Pickus, 232 Va. at 9, 348 S.E.2d at 205. The court cited Seventh District Committee v.
Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 183 S.E.2d 713 (1983).
20. DR 1-102(A)(1) of the pre-1983 version of the Code states: "A lawyer shall not
[v]iolate a Disciplinary Rule." Rules of Court, 216 Va. 941, 1065 (1976). The 1983 version
added, "or knowingly aid another to do so."
21. DR 1-102(A)(6) of the pre-1983 version of the Code states: "A lawyer shall not
[e]ngage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." Rules of
Court, 216 Va. 941, 1066. That provision was removed from the 1983 version of the Code.
22. 232 Va. 5, 348 S.E.2d 202 (1986).
23. The complaint against Pickus was made prior to the 1983 Code revisions. At that
time, DR 9-102 stated:
(A) All funds to clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs and
expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts maintained in
the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to the lawyer or
law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
(1) Funds reasonable to pay bank charges may be deposited therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the
lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer or
law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed position shall not be withdrawn until the dispute in finally resolved.
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did not apply to him because he had no attorney-client relationship with either the lending institutions or the title insurance companies involved. The supreme court rejected this argument and
construed DR 9-102 to include third parties. 4 The court held that
"[wihen a lawyer acts as a closing or settlement attorney and no
other lawyer is involved, the closing or settlement attorney represents all the parties and, in this limited sense, all parties are his
clients. ' 2 The court further held that "the settlement attorney assumes the duties of a fiduciary and must properly handle and dispose of any funds not'26his own which he may receive in connection
with the settlement.

In the more recent case of Delk v. Virginia State Bar,27 the supreme court upheld the Board's order to suspend lawyer Delk's license for three years for violation of DRs 9-102(A), 102(B)(3) and
102(B)(4) .28 An association which made real estate loans employed
(B) A lawyer shall:
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities or other properties.
(2) Identify and label securities and properties of a client promptly upon receipt and
place them in a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping as soon as practical.
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities and other properties of a client
coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his
client regarding them.
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client or another as requested by such person the
funds, securities or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which such
person is entitled to receive.
Rules of Court, 216 Va. at 1130
24. 232 Va. at 14, 348 S.E.2d at 208. The court cited the comment to DR 9-102, which

appears in the

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY 441 (1979). This comment states: "DR 9-102 sets forth rules to govern the attorney's

handling of moneys and other properties on behalf of clients or third parties."
25. 232 Va. at 15, 348 S.E.2d at 209.
26. Id.
27. 233 Va. 187, 355 S.E.2d 558 (1987).
28. DR 9-102 states:
(A) All funds to clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs and
expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts maintained in
the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to the lawyer or
law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
(1) Funds reasonable to pay bank charges may be deposited therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the
lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to the
lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer or
law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute in finally resolved.
(B) A lawyer shall:
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities and other properties of a client
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Delk to close a loan made to an individual for the purchase of a
house. The association specifically instructed Delk that upon delivery of the loan check, he should close the loan, withhold closing
costs and disburse the balance as soon as possible to the association. Delk did not disburse the balance to the association in a
timely fashion nor did he maintain adequate funds in his trust account to pay the association. Further investigation by the Bar revealed that between the time of deposit of the loan in Delk's trust
account and an audit conducted by the Bar, Delk's trust account
was overdrawn twenty-four times, and on 217 business days it had
insufficient funds to cover the amount owed to the association.29
On appeal, Delk contended that the discipline he received was
arbitrary and excessive because no client had filed a complaint
against him, no client was injured by his actions and no finding of
moral turpitude was made. Delk argued further that the Board
should not have suspended his license based upon "a perceived inability on his part to have paid [the Association].'sO Delk added
that his license should not have been suspended since his "poor
accounting methods had been corrected months before any allegations of misconduct were made."'3 1 These arguments were rejected
by the court.
The court held that there is nothing in the statutes or rules relating to the discipline of attorneys which requires a client to make
a complaint prior to the investigation of alleged misconduct.32 The
court also held that the loss of money by a client is not a prerequisite for suspension of an attorney's license for mishandling funds.33
Potential injury is sufficient to warrant disbarment.34 In response
coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his

client regarding them.
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client or another as requested by such person the
funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which such
person is entitled to receive.

29. 233 Va. at 190, 355 S.E.2d at 561.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The court referred to VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74 (Cum. Supp. 1987), which permits a
complaint by "any person" regarding judicial suspension or revocation of a lawyer's license.
See Delk, 233 Va. at 191, 355 S.E.2d at 561. The court also referred to VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 6.
§ IV, 13(b)(5)(a), which provides that upon receipt of a complaint or evidence that lawyer
misconduct has occurred, the appropriate committee shall investigate the matter. See Delk,
233 Va. at 191, 355 S.E.2d at 561.
33. See Delk, 233, Va. at 191, 355 S.E.2d at 561; Maddy v. Dist. Comm., 205 Va. 652, 658,
139 S.E.2d 56, 61 (1964) (prejudice to client's legal rights not a prerequisite).
34. See Delk, 233 Va. at 191-92, 355 S.E.2d at 561 (citing LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:818 (1986)).
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to Delk's argument concerning moral turpitude, the court held that
it is not necessary to prove moral turpitude before suspending a
lawyer's license for mishandling client funds. 5 When a lawyer
knows or should have known he was dealing improperly with client
funds, there are sufficient grounds to warrant suspension. 36 The
court reasoned that Delk should have known he was misusing client funds because the trust account had been overdrawn and had
contained insufficient funds an inexcusable number of times beand the time when an
tween the time the funds were deposited
37
audit was made of the trust account.
The theme of preserving clients' funds intact was again addressed in Wright v. Virginia State Bar.38 There, the Disciplinary
Board found that lawyer Wright failed to maintain books and
records for his trust in the aggregate and for specific clients. He
routinely advanced funds from his trust account for clients and
failed to withdraw his fees from his trust account when due. He
also failed to keep sufficient funds in his trust account to satisfy
outstanding claims against it. In reply to Wright's argument that
no client had been harmed by his record-keeping deficiencies, the
court responded that "neither loss of money by a client nor proof
of a lawyer's moral turpitude is a prerequisite to a finding that the
lawyer has mismanaged his financial records and clients' funds."39
D. Excessive Fees
In Hudock v. Virginia State Bar,4 ° the supreme court affirmed
the Disciplinary Board's decision to publicly reprimand lawyer
Hudock for violating DR 2-105(A) and (B). 41 The Board deter35. See id., at 192, 355 S.E.2d at 561.
36. Id. The court again referred to the LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
01:818 (1986).
37. See Delk, 233 Va. at 192, 355 S.E.2d at 561.
38. 233 Va. 491, 357 S.E.2d 518 (1987).
39. 233 Va. at 498, 357 S.E.2d at 522.
40. 233 Va. 390, 355 S.E.2d 601 (1987).
41. Hudock's alleged misconduct occurred prior to the 1983 revisions to the Code. At that
time, DR 2-105 provided that:
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal fee or
clearly excessive fee.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a
reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness
of a fee include the following:
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
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mined that Hudock charged a fee in excess of that allowed by section 65.1-102 of the Virginia Code.42 Therefore, the fee was illegal
and in violation of DR 2-105(A) and (B).
Subsequent to Hudock's representation of a client before the Industrial Commission of Virginia ("Commission") and resulting settlement of that claim, the Commission set Hudock's fee at $2,500.
This amount was entered on a draft order submitted by Hudock to
the Commission for entry, along with directions that the remainder
of the settlement be paid to Hudock's client. Hudock, however,
had also entered into a contingency fee arrangement with his client
without notifying the Commission. Thereaftet, Hudock collected
$5,000: $2,500 from the employer pursuant to the Commission's order, and $2,500 from his client pursuant to the contingency fee
agreement. The Disciplinary Board determined that the $2,500 fee
paid to Hudock pursuant to the contingency fee arrangement was
illegal and clearly excessive, in light of section 65.1-102. Section
65.1-102 gives the Commission full power to set attorneys' fees in
workers' compensation cases.4" The court explained that since the
fee charged by Hudock was in excess of that set by the Commission, it was illegal and violated the provisions of DR 2-105(A). The
court also rejected arguments made by Hudock that section
65.1-102 violates the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Constitution.
In Chippenham Hospital, Inc. v. LeGrand,44 a circuit court considered whether an attorney's fees were excessive. In this instance,
the attorney and client entered into a guaranty agreement wherein
the attorney would receive twenty-five percent of the recovery
which resulted in a fee of $10,000 for four hours Work. The circuit
court rejected the attorney's argument that fee arrangements are
between the attorney and client and found that the fee in this instance was unreasonable. 45 Based upon the four hours work done
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-102 (Repl. Vol. 1980) stated: "Fees of attorneys . . . whether
employed by employer, employee or insurance carrier under this Act, shall be subject to the
approval and award of the Commission. . . ... This section has been revised, but the provisions relevant here remain unchanged. See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-102 (Interim Supp. 1987).
43. See 233 Va. at 393, 355 S.E.2d at 603.
44. No. LK-1587-4, (Richmond Cir. 1987).
45. The court relied on Stiers v. Hall, 170 Va. 569, 197 S.E. 450 (1938), which held that
when reviewing attorney fee contract claims it is incumbent on the court to determine reasonableness when the question is raised.
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by the attorney and statements made concerning what would be
necessary to collect a judgment, the court found the reasonable
value of the attorney's services for collecting a judgment of $40,000
to be $5,000.48
E.

Venue

The District Committee is charged with the responsibility of investigating charges of misconduct when the misconduct occurs in
that particular district or where the attorney resides in or maintains an office in that district.47 In Stith v. Virginia State Bar,48
lawyer Stith asserted that the Board erred in suspending his license for three years for violation of numerous disciplinary rules.
Stith argued that the Board erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the proceedings and his petition to rehear because the Fourth
District, and not the Fifth District, should have investigated the
two complaints made against him.
Relying on Smolka v. Second District Committee,4 9 the court
stated that its rule regarding investigations by the District Committee establishes venue rather than subject matter jurisdiction.
"Venue is waived if timely objection is not made. ' 50 The court reasoned that Stith's failure to object to venue when he appeared
before the Fifth District Committee on the first complaint constituted an express waiver. 1 Stith again waived his objection to
venue when he failed to object in writing or in person on the second complaint.52 The Court upheld the suspension of Stith's license, finding that his motion to dismiss and his petition for review
53
and remand were both untimely.
F. Virginia Licensed
Jurisdictions

Attorneys

Disciplined

in

Other

The Virginia Rules of Court provide that an attorney disbarred
or suspended in another jurisdiction may present evidence showing
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

No. LK-1587-4, slip op. at 1 (Richmond Cir. 1987).
VA. SuP. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, I 13(B)(4)(b).
233 Va. 222, 355 S.E.2d 310 (1987).
224 Va. 161, 295 S.E.2d 267 (1982).
233 Va. at 224, 355 S.E.2d at 311-12.
Id. at 224, 355 S.E.2d at 312.
Id.
Id. at 225, 355 S.E.2d at 312.
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cause why similar discipline should not be imposed in Virginia24
In Cummings v. Virginia State Bar,5 5 the supreme court considered what extrinsic evidence may be admitted by the attorney disciplined in the foreign jurisdiction to show why a similar sanction
should not be imposed in Virginia.
Lawyer Cummings, licensed in Virginia and the District of Columbia, was disbarred "on consent" by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals." Consequently, the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board temporarily suspended Cummings' license and directed
him to show cause why he should not receive the same discipline
imposed by the District of Columbia. In his answer, Cummings al54. VA. SuP. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, I 13(F) provides:
Whenever there shall be filed with the Executive Director evidence that an Attorney admitted to practice in this State has been disbarred or suspended from practice
in another jurisdiction and that such disciplinary action has become final, the Board
shall forthwith enter an order suspending the license of the Attorney and directing
the Attorney to show cause why the same sanction that was imposed in the other
jurisdiction should not be imposed by the Board. The Board shall forthwith serve
upon the Respondent by certified mail (a) a copy of such certificate, (b) a copy of
such order, and (c) a notice fixing the time and place of a hearing to determine what
action should be taken by the Board. The hearing shall be set not less than twentyone nor more than thirty days after the date of the order. Within fourteen days of the
date of mailing, the Respondent shall file a written response, which shall be confined
to allegations that:
(1) The record of the proceeding in the other jurisdiction would clearly show that such
proceeding was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a denial of due process; or
(2) The imposition of the Board of the same sanction upon the same proof would result
in a grave injustice; or
(3) The same conduct would not be ground for disciplinary action or for the same sanction in this State.
The respondent shall have the burden of producing the record upon which he relies to
support allegations (1), (2), or (3) above, and he shall be limited at the hearing to reliance
upon the allegations of his written response. Except to the extent the allegations of the
respondent's written response are established, the findings in the other jurisdiction shall be
conclusive of all matters for purposes of the proceeding before the Board. If at the time
fixed for hearing the respondent has not filed a written response or shall not appear or if the
Board, after hearing, shall determine that the respondent has failed to establish the allegations of his written response, the Board shall impose the same discipline that was imposed
in the other jurisdiction. If the Board shall determine that the respondent has established
the allegations of his written response, it shall, in its discretion, dismiss the proceeding or
impose a lesser sanction than was imposed in the other jurisdiction. A copy of any order
imposing sanction shall be served upon the respondent by certified mail. Any such order
shall be final and binding subject only to appeal as hereinafter provided."
Id.
55. 233 Va. 363, 355 S.E.2d 588 (1987).
56. 233 Va. at 366, 355 S.E.2d at 590. Attorney Cummings was investigated over a threeyear period by the District of Columbia Bar, but no formal complaint was ever filed. Cummings filed an affidavit consenting to disbarment based on an alleged misuse of client funds.
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leged that discipline should not be imposed in Virginia because he
had not misused client funds and because the same conduct which
was the basis for his disbarment in the District of Columbia would
not result in disbarment in Virginia. After ruling that his answer
failed to allege any grounds which would authorize the Board to
impose a sanction other than that imposed by the District of Columbia, the Board refused to hear any evidence in support of Cummings' answer. The Board then ordered disbarment.5
The supreme court upheld the Board's decision not to allow
Cummings to relitigate any issues of fact decided in the District of
Columbia, 58 but reversed the Board's decision to refuse to receive
extrinsic evidence.5" The court interpreted the Code as requiring
the Board to impose the same discipline as the foreign jurisdiction
unless the attorney proves one of the three defenses listed in the
Code. 0 Under one defense, the attorney is permitted to show that
extenuating circumstances exist which might mitigate the sanctions imposed in Virginia.6 1 Thus, the court held that Cummings
was entitled to present evidence which might mitigate the sanctions in Virginia. The court concluded that under the rules, the
Board should weigh the facts and circumstances of each case
rather than mechanically apply the same discipline as imposed in
62
the foreign jurisdiction.
G. Discretion of Disciplinary Board When Applying Sanctions
In a series of cases beginning with Blue v. Seventh District Committee63 and ending with Tucker v. Virginia State Bar,64 the supreme court has defined the scope of review of decisions rendered
by the Disciplinary Board. In Blue, the appellant argued that the
Board's findings of fact were no more than recommendations to
the court. The court could therefore redetermine the facts in appellate review. 5 The bar argued, however, that the Board's factual
findings were entitled to the same consideration as those made by
57. See id.
58. Id. at 367, 355 S.E.2d at 591.
59. See id. at 368, 355 S.E.2d at 591.
60. See id. at 367, 355 S.E.2d at 591.
61. See id. (imposition of same discipline based on same proof would result in grave
injustice).
62. See id. at 368, 355 S.E.2d at 591.
63. 220 Va. 1056, 265 S.E.2d 753, cert. denied, 448 U.S. 904 (1980).
64. 233 Va. 526, 357 S.E.2d 525 (1987).
65. See 220 Va. at 1060, 265 S.E.2d at 757.
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a circuit court empanelled pursuant to the Code." The court concluded that it would examine the record independently and treat
the Board's findings as prima facie correct. While not given the
weight of a jury verdict, those conclusions will be sustained unless
it appears they are not justified by a reasonable view of the evi7
dence or are contrary to law.
The court reaffirmed this holding in Tucker. In Tucker, the
court recognized that a number of its members would have imposed a lesser sanction than that imposed by the Board. Nevertheless, explaining that the Board had broad discretion, the majority
concluded that upon independent examination of the record, the
Board had properly exercised its discretion. 8
The court also ruled during its June term that the Board may
consider prior acts of misconduct when considering the appropriateness of a sanction. In Wright v. Virginia State Bar,6 9 Wright
argued that the Board improperly considered Wright's prior private reprimands. The court concluded, however, that the Board
would have been derelict in its duty to the public and the profession if it had not considered Wright's prior acts of misconduct.7 0
III.

CONCLUSION

What can we discern from the recent decisions of the court? One
fact is the emergence of the Disciplinary Board as the preeminent
arbiter of legal ethics in Virginia. Inbued with broad discretion in
the adjudication of ethical matters, the Virginia Supreme Court
appears to allow the board's decisions to stand unless clearly
wrong.
What principles arise? One is that a trust account violation need
not depend upon knowledge of trust irregularities. Ignorance of the
trust account requirements will not excuse one from accountability; violation of the trust account requirements may subject one to
a substantial sanction. Another is that the profession will not abide
among its members duplicity, fraud or neglect of a client's affairs.

66. Id. (referring to VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74 (Supp. 1980)).
67. See 220 Va. at 1061-62, 265 S.E.2d at 756-57.
68. 233 Va. at 534, 357 S.E.2d at 529-30.
69. 233 Va. 491, 357 S.E.2d 518 (1987).
70. 233 Va. at 497, 357 S.E.2d at 521; see also Tucker v. Virginia State Bar, 233 Va. 526,
357 S.E.2d 525 (1987).

